INTRODUCTION

 

On Christmas day 1991 President Bush received a surprise gift when Mikhail Gorbachev officially dissolved the Soviet Union.

 

In 1991 the Soviet Union broke into 15 independent countries, each adopting a more or less democratic constitution.  It was a Cold War victory for the United States.  But was it a victory for democracy?  What’s happening in these countries today?  As the brunt of our democratic attention focuses on the Middle East, let us step back and take a look at events in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.  Let us inventory the post-Soviet democracies.

 

But first some historical context: At the end of WWII fascism was defeated and replaced with democracy in Western Germany and Italy.  Consider this as a first wave of modern-day democratization.  A second wave occurred in the 1960s and 70s when Greece, Spain and Portugal also rejected fascism and became democratic.  A third wave rapidly swept Central Europe in 1989 with the fall of Soviet influence and in 1990 with the freeing of the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—which were the last republics conscripted into the Soviet Union and the first to go their own way.

 

And now—15 years later—a fourth wave is swelling and aimed at the 12 remaining post-Soviet countries.  So as we conduct our inventory, let us ask these questions: Why has it formed?  Where is it going?  And who’s trying to stop it?

 

This wave began in the Caucasus, so let us look there first...

 

 

THE CAUCASUS

 

Armenia: In Armenia, President Robert Kocharyan, a former Communist Party official, has been in power since 1998 and has a despot rating of 2 truncheons.  There was an attempt at a pro-democracy revolution following his re-election on February 19, 2003 when opposition leaders mounted large protests against the official results.  For two days the central plaza was thronged with protesters.  They marched, waved flags and gave speeches, but eventually they shrank from confrontation with the state.  President Kocharyan continues his authoritarian rule.

 

Azerbaijan: In neighboring Azerbaijan, President Haydar Aliyev was a former First Secretary of Communist Party, Former KGB member, and former Politburo member.  He came to power in a 1993 coup and stayed until he collapsed in public in 2003.  He died later that year, but not before installing his son, Ilhaim, as president in the easily-rigged October 15 election (where the Central Election Commission discounted 20% of the ballots for apparently unclear reasons.)

 

Both father and son score 3 truncheons on the Despot Scale, so when clashes broke out election night and the following day between police and protesters the military was immediately sent in and easily crushed the demonstration.  The crackdown was extended countrywide, removing the opposition—at least for the time being—as a player in national politics.  The Aliyev family continues to rule Azerbaijan.

 

Georgia: And in Georgia—a country who’s patron Saint is St. George the Dragon Slayer—a parliamentary election was held November 2, 2003 that turned out far more interesting than anyone expected.  As widely anticipated the contest was rigged.  But Georgians did something unprecedented in the former Soviet region in that the opposition mounted a popular campaign to resist the falsification of an election—and they succeeded.  President Shevardnadze—with a despot rating of only two truncheons—was unprepared for the protest and unlike the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan he didn’t use force to quash the demonstration. In the end the protesters not only succeeded, but they toppled Mr. Shevardnadze and his government. And this is how it happened...

 

Immediately after balloting, three opposition leaders joined together and charged the authorities with falsification and then mobilized supporters into the streets.  At first the crowd was small.

 

But then the crowd increased after international observers concluded the election fell short of a number of international commitments and included wide-spread, systematic fraud.

 

The crowd increased after international election observers concluded that the election “fell short of a number of international commitments” and included “widespread and systematic fraud.”

 

But the Central Election commission withheld announcing the election results, and the longer they delayed the bigger the crowd became.  For several tense weeks, protesters thronged Tbilisi’s main square.  Georgia’s independent TV station broadcast continuous newscasts on the developing crisis, not concealing its sympathy for the demonstrators.  Negotiations between Shevardnadze and the opposition triumvirate, which demanded new elections and then, egged on by Saakashvili, increasingly shifted to calling for Shevardnadze’s resignation, failed to resolve the standoff.  As the peaceful crowd continued to grow, and so did the military presence as they began assembling military troops in hooded ski masks.

 

U.S. and Russian mediators were closely involved in the talks, hoping to find a solution. 

 

Finally, after three weeks of delays, the Central Election Commission announced the official results.  Mikhail Saakashvili’s party received only 18 percent of the vote.  This didn’t go over well with the swelling crowd of protesters outside the Parliament building.  Three days later Mr. Shevardnadze makes an announcement

 

Later that day Mr. Shevardnadze resigns his presidency.   In the Caucasus, the legacy of St. George runs stronger than the legacy of the Soviet Union.  Nino Burjanadze, the parliamentary Speaker, becomes interim President.

 

Interim President Burjanadze’s first order of business is to meet with the Georgian military.  Her second order of business is to meet the United States and Russian delegations.  Once all is secure, she calls a “snap” election in January.  She does not run as a candidate.

 

But free and fare elections are difficult in a country with three separatist regions, all Russian backed, one with an active Russian military base.  Aslan Abashidze—the self-appointed president of the self-declared autonomous region of Ajara—states his disapproval.

 

The OSCE international observers monitored the election and reported that the election “demonstrated notable progress over previous elections, and brought the country closer to meeting international commitments and standards for democratic elections”.

 

The election was less a contest among candidates than a coronation.  Though five other politicians threw their hat into the ring, Saakashvili’s victory was certain.  His leadership of the peaceful revolution had completely transformed Georgian politics.  He won the election with over 90 percent of the vote.

 

A year later there was a repeat of the Rose Revolution as Aslan Abashidze, the self-proclaimed leader of Adjara, was overthrown by peaceful protests and he began a trend when he fled to Moscow on the airplane of Russian Security Council chief Igor Ivanov.

 

After success in returning Ajara to federal control, and while negotiating the same for South Ossetia, Zurab Zhavnia, the Prime Minister and the government’s lead negotiator, suddenly died—here in this apartment—apparently by a leaky gas stove. 

 

But overall things are going well: the economy is improving, federal control has strengthened, and a more balanced East-West foreign policy has emerged.  

 

 

CAUCASUS SUMMARY

 

As we say “do svadanya” to the Caucasus let us review what we’ve learned about our three questions:

 

This wave of democracy started when enough Georgians got feed up with the Soviet legacy of economic stagnation, corruption, and rigged elections.  Ironically, it was Shevardnadze’s semi-liberal policies allowing some press freedom, opposition parties, and civil society that lead to the success of the revolution that ousted him.

 

But while Georgia is a success, democracy struggles in Armenia and in Azerbaijan as western governments hesitate to encourage change that may disrupt oil supplies.

 

However, the biggest impediments to democracy in the Caucasus are the remaining incumbent despotic presidents along with Mr. Putin’s support for Georgia’s autonomous regions.

 

Now we move on to the Central Asian Republics...

 

 

CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS

 

Kirgirstan: Although in Kirgirstan they’re treading the line between close ties with Moscow and democracy.  Askar Akaev, an occasionally liberal president with a despot rating of only two truncheons, held power since before independence; however, he was overthrown following rigged Parliamentary elections in March 2005.

 

The revolution was in response to the blatant nepotism and corruption of the entrenched regime, and it got off to a good start when the protesters gave their movement a color and a unified opposition candidate emerged.  But by the end it resembled a riot more than an organized protest, and it produced a result similar to a violent coup more than a peaceful change of government.

 

At the height of the protest, Mr. Akeav fled to Moscow and was welcomed by Mr. Putin.

 

These guarantees are full immunity and retention of all personal assets obtained while in office.

 

An special election was held July 10, 2005 and the leading opposition candidate, won with over 88% of the vote.

 

However, Kirgizstan’s new government hasn’t signaled a shift in policy away from it’s cozy relationship with Russia, nor has it signaled a toward a more liberal form of democratic government.

 

Uzbekistan: However in neighboring Uzbekistan, authoritarianism continues to dominate politics.

 

The United States asked President Karimov—with his despot rating of four truncheons—to respect human rights because on May 13, 2005 government troops shot dead several hundred unarmed protesters who began imitating what happened in neighboring Kirgizstan only a few months earlier.

 

During the crisis, President Karimov consults with Mr. Putin by telephone.

 

Tajikistan: Authoritarianism also runs strong in Tajikistan, which is ruled by the well-entrenched Imomali Rakhmanov and it appears unlikely that there’ll be an unplanned change of government anytime soon.

 

Turkmenistan: And in Turkmenistan the situation is similar as the regions most authoritative president, Saparmurat Niyazov, scoring five truncheons, is firmly in control.

 

Kazakhstan: Of the Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan has the most contact with the democratic nations of Europe, and a large number of it’s people appear to want a change in government. However, the 2004 events in Georgia convinced President Nursultan Nazarbaev to swiftly shut down all independent television and media. Then in January 2005 he shut down the leading opposition party.

If democracy comes to Kazakhstan, it must first face a strong fight from the current regime.

 

 

CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS SUMMARY

 

As we say “do svadanya” to the Central Asian Republics let us review what we’ve learned:

 

First, the revolt in Kirgizstan was against the nepotism and corruption of the president and his family more than it was for creating a pro-western democracy. 

 

Second, with no history of representational government, democracy does not have much traction in this part of the world and there’s little chance for significant change, with the possible exception of Kazakhstan.

 

And third, the impediments to democracy are the four remaining authoritarian presidents, their willingness to use violence, and their continuing close ties to Moscow and Mr. Putin.

 

Now we move on to Eastern Europe...

 

The post-communist area is the best example for those who believe democracy will emerge throughout the world.  The Middle East appears apprehensive about embracing democracy; and China is not willing, at least not yet. But Post-Soviet, Eastern Europe is the only place where countries are freely turning to democratic institutions and democratic culture.

 

 

UKRAINE

 

Ukraine’s Leonid Kuchma—another occasionally liberal president who allowed some independent media and opposition political parties—was retiring after two terms as president. His pro-Moscow protégé Viktor Yanukovch was running with his full support.  On October 31, 2004 Ukrainians voted for their third president since independence.  Twenty-six candidates were on the ballot but no candidate received a majority so a second-round election was schedule between the two top candidates.  And on November 21, Ukrainians went back to the polls, stood in line, showed their ID, considered the two candidates one last time, and then voted their conscience.  Again, like in the first round, voter turnout was high, close to 80 percent.  By the end of the day, independent exit polls put the opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko ahead by 11 percent.

 

The votes were counted in election commission offices across the country; and throughout the night the results were updated and broadcast.  A small crowd gathered in Kiev’s central square—simply known as Miadan—where they followed the election results on the giant state-run TV screen.  They cheered for their preferred candidate...pitched a few tents...and danced the night away.

 

However, by the middle of the night the government’s official election results were significantly different from the exit polls.  So the opposition candidate called for his supporters to come to Maidan to ‘rise and take a stand’ for democracy.  Nobody was ready for what happened next: not the city of Kiev, not the national government and its pro-Moscow regime, and perhaps not even the protesters themselves.

 

By daybreak what had been not more than a hundred or so students became something very different.  People arrived.  More and more people.  They kept coming throughout the day.  Not just students, but everybody: grandparents and pensioners came; mothers with children were there; and the laborers, the backbone of the nation, arrived in large number.  They stood side-by-side, shoulder-to-shoulder.  They brought flags and more tents.  By late afternoon they had a stage and giant TVs of their own.

 

Throughout the day the protesters received encouragement.  International observers stated that: “...the election did not meet a considerable number of OSCE commitments” and that the government pressured voters and misused state resources including the media.

 

And United States Senator Richard Lugar stated: "It is now apparent that a concerted and forceful program of election day fraud and abuse was enacted with either the leadership or cooperation of the governmental authorities."

 

By the end of the day a revolution was beginning.  The next morning the Kiev Mayor addressed the crowd.

 

The protests were not only in Kiev...They occurred throughout Ukraine.

 

However, the Central Election Commission announces Prime Minister Yanucovych the winner and next president.

 

How do you steal an election?

 

Step 1, the state controls the media.  Use government-issued guidance on how to report the news.  “When covering the event, do not show long shots of the rally or the crowd, show only groups of drunk people with socially inappropriate deviant behavior."

 

Step 2, kill the opposition.  Opposition leader Viktor Yushenko nearly died after dinning with the government’s top security officer and being poisoned with the chemical TCCD, which, oddly enough, is the active ingredient in the defoliant “Agent Orange.”

 

Step 3, vote early and often.

 

Step 4, control who counts the vote.

 

Step 5, control the Central Election Commission.

 

And that's how you steal an election!

 

The Ukrainian people did rise and they took a stand...They stood in Maidan, in the center of Kiev.  They stood all though the day and all through the night.  They stood in the snow and in bitter cold temperatures.  And they stood peacefully, even as military troops assembled around them.

 

The crowd continued to grow...100,000...200,000...400,000.  They came by train and by bus, then the government shut down all public transport into Kiev and closed the highways.  But still the crowd grew...600,000...800,000.  They found a way to get there.  And more than a million Ukrainians gathered in the center of Kiev.  

 

As the color orange spread across Ukraine, the government regime realized they made two mistakes in their plans to steal the election.  First they underestimated the resolve of the Ukrainian people.  And then, on November 25, right after the Central Election Commission announced Yanukovych as the official winner, they realized they underestimated their control over the media.

 

The protest in Maidan spread to the doorstep of the State Television Channel 1 studio.

 

State television Channel 1 news reporters—many wearing orange in support of the opposition party—went on strike and demanded to show live broadcasts of Maidan , and to give balanced coverage of both candidates.

 

Channel 5, Ukraine’s leading independent channel, was continuously broadcasting live coverage of the protest.  But on November 25 at 7:30 in the evening, after Natalya Dmitruk's protest, journalists at Channel 1+1—Ukraine’s private but state-influenced leading channel—broke their silence and began covering the protests.

 

By 6 PM on November 26, and after their journalists threatened to strike,

Channels INTER and ITCV also changed their programming and began to show full and honest coverage of the protests.

 

Finally, on November 27, after a three-day strike by its journalists, the “sensor within” at Channel 1 was done away with and journalists began to freely report the news.  However, television company 'Ykraina" never fully reported on the Orange Revolution protests.

 

After two weeks of revolution, [a very nervous] the Supreme Court took a stand for the rule of law.

 

The court decision energized the protesters...but how do you keep a revolution going into its third and forth week?

 

Well, start with and organized tent city to house protesters from outside Kiev, and then bring in truck-loads of food and hot water.  And if that’s not enough, then hope there’s a McDonalds nearby.  In Kiev there are three McDonalds at Maidan plaza.

 

Then provide entertainment—both traditional and classical...and maybe a pop theme song.  Razom Nas Bahato...Together we are many.

 

You also need speeches, lots of speeches.  Speeches by politicians...and speeches by the police and military...And of course speeches by past heroes of democracy.

 

Another way to keep protesters energized is for president Kuchma to leave Ukraine—during this time of national crisis—and travel to Moscow for a two-day meeting with Mr. Putin.  Particularly when the result is statements like these:  "Any kind of re-run election in Ukraine will fail.  And then what?  You'll have a 4th, 5th and 25th election until one side achieves it's desired result."  "The only way Ukraine can settle this crises without loosing our national pride is with Russian help."

 

After the Supreme Court made a stand for the rule of law, the Parliament then followed suit.

 

All these events are rather confusing. So to help you out, here’s a quick summary.

 

And on the other side of the Rubicon is the repeat second-round election.

 

How do you loose an election?

 

Step 1, have a parade.  Have a parade a week before the election to celebrate the anniversary of Soviet liberation of Ukraine from Nazi Germany, although the anniversary wasn’t for another two weeks.  And invite Mr. Putin and look “presidential” while standing next to him, and have a snack.

 

Step 2, give wife microphone.

 

Step 3, character reference.  Nestor Shufrych is the top aid to Yanukovych and was the leading candidate to be to Chief of Staff, if Yanukovych wins.

 

Step 4, the egg incident.  There were stronger, more respected candidates the government could have selected, so why choose Yanukovych?  Perhaps it was arrogance.  But arrogance can strike back.  Like with this simple egg.  The Ukrainian mentality has been to let the political elite do what they want.  It’s a mentality that helped the Soviet Union persist as long as it did.  And perhaps after 14 years of success and control the powers that be became arrogant.  The choice for candidate, which was in effect the choice of the presidential successor, was made not on qualifications but on who was easiest to control.  Often the least qualified is the easiest to control.  Viktor Yanukovych—the twice-arrested, former street gangster—posed the least threat to the political and business elite.

 

Step 5, split the country in half.  Yanukovych stood on stage with the Moscow Mayor, during an “autonomy” conference to promote splitting Ukraine into two separate countries.  And he did this before the re-run election.  Any reasonably competent candidate would have won but Yanukovych was just too much of a buffoon for the Ukrainian people to sit by quietly as he stole the election.

 

And that’s how you loose and election!

 

For the third time in three months Ukrainians went to the polls to choose their next president.

 

After five weeks of fighting for democracy through peaceful protest, many Ukrainians voted with a sense of ownership about their country and it’s political future.

 

With a generally free and fare election, opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko easily won.

 

 

MOLDOVA

 

Moldova presents an alternative example to the popular uprisings in Georgia and Ukraine.  Western-style democracy is coming to Moldova not through massive street protests, but through gradual, planned change.  In 2001 Moldavians, in a rather free and fare election, voted the pro-Moscow communist party into power, and Vladimir Voronin became president. However, shortly after taking office, President Voronin...an occasionally moderate president with a despot rating of only two truncheons...began aligning Moldova closer to Western Europe and away from Russia. 

 

By the time he was re-elected in March 2005—and again in a mostly free and fair election—President Voronin had lead Europe’s only remaining communist-lead country closer to integrating with the European Union.

 

Of course, there’s the noted exception of biasness in the state–run media.

 

But some Moldavians want quicker change.  And taking the color of Ukraine’s opposition, they march in protest.  But it’s difficult to mobilize a revolution when the government and the opposition are unified in their dislike of Moscow and Russian President Putin. 

 

It’s even harder to mobilize a revolution when the Communists took their election victory and then, surprisingly, formed a coalition with the Christian Democrates and President Vornonin appointed the pro-west opposition leader Iurie Rosca as Deputy Chairman of Parliament.

 

Now the government and the opposition can work together against the biggest threat to Moldovan independence, which is Russian interference within Moldova’s territorial border...starting with the autonomous region of Transnistria.

 

 

BELARUS

 

Prospects for democracy faded in Belarus with the 1994 election of Alexander Lukashenko.  Since then, Lukashenko—with a despot rating of four truncheons—has consolidated his rule and established a system of unlimited presidential authority. Lukashenko ignores international criticism of his antidemocratic policies largely because of continuous economic and political support given to him by Russia.  This support allows the government to preserve social stability through welfare policies that provide the population with minimally acceptable living standards.

 

The October 2004 referendum changed the constitution to permit Lukashenko a third term as president.  The campaign included state-sponsored commercials like this one that blatantly support the amendment.

 

But Belarus is like Ukraine in some ways.  They both have a history of rigged elections.  And in Minsk, like in Kiev, there’s a really big TV in the middle of the central plaza.

 

Belarus does have a pro-western opposition, and they often take to the streets to protest.  And they are lead by this man, Anatoly Lebedko.

 

While protesting the referendum, the KGB took opposition leader Anatoly Lebedko into a pizza parlor.  A tug-of-war ensued over the door with the opposition trying to rescue him.  The KGB won.  Lebedko was beaten and hospitalized for a week.

 

If history is a guide, then there’ll be reason to protest as there hasn’t been a fair election since Lukashenko came to power.  And how did he come to power?

 

Lukashenko’s rise to power began in 1991 with the signing of the Soviet Union dissolution treaty, which said: “The Soviet Union as a geopolitical reality and a subject of international law has ceased to exist."

 

In the lead up to the 1994 election, the liberals who brought democracy to Belarus began to fight among themselves, thus opening the door for Lukashenko’s populism.

 

And if Belarus is to have it’s own revolution, then the people will need to flood the streets like they did in 1991 and once again make a stand for democracy.

 

An extreme example of propaganda programming is the TV series Konspirilogy.

 

Propaganda is not limited to television.  It also flourishes in the print media.  Before the October election the government printed special newspapers to promote Lukashenko’s imagine.  See, children like him. There he is as a soccer star—shown next to a real Olympic athlete—and here he is as the father of the homeland.

 

 

EASTERN EUROPE SUMMARY

 

As we say “do svadanya” to Eastern Europe let us review what we’ve learned:

 

Eastern Europe is ready for democratic revolution as these countries have increasing exposure to western Europe, which accelerates the death of its Soviet legacy.  Ukraine’s Orange Revolution was driven by average citizens from all parts of society: students and pensioners were active, yes, but it was propelled by presence of families and women—mothers, daughters and grandmothers.  But developing democracy in post-Soviet countries will be a long, drawn-out process, with no guarantee of success.

 

So far this wave has reached countries with at least a small history of liberal policies toward the media, opposition political parties, and civil society.  But if the wave is to continue, then it will face increasingly more difficult regimes.  But from Ukraine the wave is well positioned to continue into neighboring Belarus.

 

Again, it is the usual suspects working to stop this wave.  In Belarus, President Lukashenko violently cracks down on the opposition, and his policies and economy are directly supported by Moscow and Mr. Putin.

 

So why does Mr. Putin do this?

 

 

RUSSIA

 

Mr. Putin’s Russia remains a collection of multinational states in need of a unifying idea of statehood and nationality to keep them together.  The easiest and the most understandable idea for Russians to cling to is patriotism...Soviet patriotism...

 

So in Russia, like in Belarus, the holiday most celebrated by the government is May 9th; the day the Soviet Union defeated Nazi Germany.  There are striking similarities—minus the tanks—between the celebration in Russia today and those of the Soviet Union 30 and 60 years ago.

 

Furthermore, Mr. Putin does not hide his desire to resurrect the Soviet empire.  In April 2005, on a live TV broadcast, he said “The breakup of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.”

 

Additionally, Mr. Putin: Weakened laws protecting ownership of private property and imprisoned independent business leaders; closed all independent TV news channels; decreed that regional governors no longer will be elected by the people but appointed by the president; and re-wrote the Russian national Anthem to incorporate the old Soviet Union anthem.

 

Moscow uses its energy monopoly to influence neighboring countries, particularly Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. The control is exerted through a preferential pricing policy.  The less a country supports Moscow, the more it has to pay for energy.  It’s an exaggeration to call this policy imperialistic, but its manipulative nature is apparent to anyone dependent on Russian energy.

 

Similarly, Moscow uses its foreign military bases to influence and destabilize neighboring countries, particularly Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.

 

Hopefully the future will be this optimistic, but Mr. Putin will continue to interfere with this fourth wave of democracy as it swells toward his allies in Kazakhstan, Belarus and Azerbaijan.  His efforts are rooted in concern that if more post-Soviet states become democratic, then Russia must abandon hope for resurrecting its empire.  Moreover, if Ukraine, Georgia or Moldova (particularly Ukraine!) continues on its journey to independence and fully embraces liberal democracy, then Mr. Putin will find it difficult to continue denying it to his own people.